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Exemplary Damages In Medical Malpractice
Actions: California's Requirement For
Posting Of A Cost Bond By Plaintiff
In recent years there has been a growing concern with what
has come to be called in Californiaa medical "malpractice crisis."
In 1972 the CaliforniaLegislature passed Senate Bill 941 amending Section 1029.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure to allow a defendant in a medical malpractice action to move for an ex parte order requiring the plaintiff to post security of not less than $2,500
in order to pursue a cause for exemplary damages. This legislation was aimed at the problem arising as a result of the California
policy of prohibiting medical malpractice insurance from covering exemplary damages. Under the old law a complaint which
included a prayer for exemplary damages therefore gave the plaintiff a "wedge" with which to bargain for a favorable settlement.
This comment briefly discusses the implications of the new legislation upon the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. The author concludes that while the changes involved in Civil Procedure
Code Section 1029.6 may in fact prevent the threat of the use of
exemplary damages as a bargaining device in any but the most
flagrant situations, it appears inherently unfair and presents serious questions of constitutional validity under the due process
and equal protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment.
In 1972 the California Legislature amended Section 1029.6 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.' As amended, it allows a defendant in a medical malpractice action to move the court for an ex parte order requiring
the plaintiff to post security in the minimum amount of $2,500 in order
to pursue his cause for exemplary damages. Since medical malpractice insurance policies do not provide coverage for exemplary damages, 2 a complaint which included a prayer for these damages under
the old law provided the plaintiff a "wedge" with which to bargain for

a speedy, favorable settlement of compensatory damages.3

It was ar-

gued that this bargaining wedge encouraged frivolous requests for exemplary damages, thereby creating what was called a "blackjack" ef1. S.B. 941, CAL. STATS. 1972, c. 653.
2. CAL. Crv. CODE §1668; CAL. INS. CODE §533.
3. AMERICAN TRIAL LAwYERS ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTIE-THE ATL
SEMiNAR 31, 60-61 (1966).
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fect. It was this blackjack effect at which the 1972 legislation was
aimed. 4
While this legislation may very well prevent the threat of exemplary
damages as a bargaining device in all but the most flagrant situations,
it appears to be inherently unfair and it presents a possible violation
of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment.
In order to more fully understand and to clarify the implications of the
constitutional questions involved, as well as to point the way to correct
the statute's inequities, it is necessary to examine what has come to be
known as the medical "malpractice crisis" and California's previous
responses to it.
TAE

MALPRACTICE CRISIS

The rate at which medical malpractice litigation has increased in
recent years has far exceeded the overall rate of increase in general
litigation.5 While it is true that the absence of any central agency to
which reports are made results in a scarcity of reliable statistics,0 it has
been estimated that from 1930 to 1940 the number of malpractice
claims rose ten-fold and increased another ten-fold from 1940 to 1950.7
The trend has not yet abated. In 1969 the Aetna Life and Casualty
Company indicated a 43 percent increase in the number of medical malpractice claims it had processed during the previous five years."
A recent article has cited the following reasons as the major contributors to the increase in lawsuits: a radical change in the patient's
attitude toward his body-the patient is better educated medically and
more medically sophisticated; a changed attitude toward the medical
profession-the doctor is no longer viewed as the "good samaritan" of
the "country doctor" era, but now has the tarnished image of the
"super-successful" businessman; the impersonalization of medicine-the
patient is no longer treated by one doctor that he knows and trusts,
but instead, is rotated through various teams of specialists; bad public
relations by the doctor who spends too little time establishing doctorpatient rapport; and finally, an inadequate supply of doctors to meet
modem health care demands."
The effects of increased litigation on the medical profession and on
4. Los Angeles Daily Journal, July 6, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
5. Morris, Response to Ribicoff: Malpractice Suits vs. Patient Care, 37 INS.

COUNSEL J. 206, 213 (1970).

6. Brooke, Medical Malpractice: A Socio-Economic Problem from a Doctor's

View, 6 WmLAMETE L.J. 225, 227 (1970).

7.

AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSocIATIoN,

SEMINAR 31 (1966).

8. Brooke, supra note 6, at 227.
9. Morris, supra note 5, at 214-16 (1970).

MEDICAL MALPRACTIcE-THE

ATL
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society in general have been adverse." ° Within the medical profession,
the impact has resulted in ulta-conservatism on the part of the doctors. This has come to be known as "negative defensive medicine'
and consists of a doctor refusing to engage in activities with a high
risk of resulting law suits." Additionally, doctors resort to "positive
defensive medicine," a performance of procedures which are not required but which are used to create evidence of the doctor's diligence.' 2
Finally, it has been asserted that the doctor's awareness of a possible
malpractice suit is itself a factor contributing to the breakdown of the
doctor-patient rapport.'"
Moreover, it is argued that this increased litigation has resulted in
a decrease in both the quantity and quality of available medical care.
The unnecessary utilization of procedures and facilities has reduced
their availability to other patients, thereby decreasing the quantity of
care available.' 4 The quality of care has suffered as a result of
the reluctance of doctors to accept patients with complicated problems, to
use high risk techniques when the situation calls for it, and to adopt
new and innovative medical procedures."
A further result of the increase in malpractice litigation has been
the rise in the cost of medical care services. The expense of the extra
tests ordered to document the patients ailments and the doctor's diligence are of course passed on to the consumer. This, however, is not
the only increase. Also contributing to the increased medical prices
are several other categories of costs of doing business in the medical
profession. Included among these operating costs are premiums
charged for malpractice insurance.' 6 The increased number of malpractice lawsuits which must be investigated and defended, along with
the increased number and amount of judgments, 1 7 has caused a tremendous increase in malpractice insurance premiums and a decline
in the number of carriers who are willing to write policies in this
8
area.'
All of these factors, the increase in medical malpractice litigation,
the rising costs, and the malpractice insurance problem, have com10. Comment, The California Malpractice Controversy, 9 STAN. L. REV. 731
(1957).
11. The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DuKE
L.J. 939, 949.
12. Ribicoff, Medical Malpractice: the patient vs. the physician, 6 TRIAL No. 2,
at 10 (1970).
13. Id. at 11.
14. The Medical MalpracticeThreat, supra note 11, at 950.
15. The Medical MalpracticeThreat, supra note 11, at 949.
16. Uhthoff, Medical Malpractice-The Insurance Scene, 43 ST. JoHN's L REv.
578, 579 (1969).
17. Brooke, supra note 6, at 227.
18. Ribicoff, supra note 12, at 13.
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bined to create a situation which has been labeled the "malpractice
crisis."'

9

RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS

In addition to the attention the crisis has received from the legal
and medical professions and the insurance industry, it has also been
the subject of governmental scrutiny. In 1969 the United States Senate issued a resolution calling for a study to analyze the problems basic
to breakdowns in the organization, financing, and delivery of health
care, as well as the factors contributing to the skyrocketing cost.2" In
California, the Speaker of the Assembly in 1972 directed the Assembly
Committee on Rules to study the subject of medical malpractice litigation and the feasibility of creating a state administrative agency to
initially hear and determine the merits of medical malpractice cases.,
California's interest in the malpractice crisis, however, is not of such
recent origin.
The California Legislature, during the past few years, has passed
several statutes which affect the professional liability of doctors. Proponents of this legislation declared an intent not to complicate the meritorious suit, but rather to clarify and improve the position of the professional in a liability case.22 Taken alone, each statute has done little
to solve the professional liability problem. As a package, however,
they go a long way toward the goal of curtailing the trend toward soaring malpractice rates and liability suits, by improving the doctor's position in a suit and helping the insurance carriers to hold the line on pre23
miums.

This legislative package includes, among others: a law allowing the
question of the statute of limitations to be tried prior to the negligence
suit upon a motion by either plaintiff or defendant; 24 a law protecting
the proceedings and records of medical review committees of medical
societies and hospitals from discovery; 25 a law allowing an advance
payment of damages to a plaintiff without construing that payment as
19. Comment, A Four Year Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice Cases:
Will Plaintiffs Case Be Barred?, 2 PAC. L.J. 663, 666 (1971).
20. STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMMITrEE

ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION

OF THE

SENATE CoMMrrrEE ON GovERNmENTAL OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VS. THE PHYSICIAN (Comm. Print 1969).
21. JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNA ASSEMBLY 3872 (Reg. Sess. 1972).

22. Interview with I. Michael Allen, Director of Governmental Relations of the
California Medical Association, Sacramento, California, Oct. 16, 1972.
23. Id.
24. CAL. CODE Cwv. PRoc. §597.5. The initial settling of this issue will avoid
lengthy, costly trials, thereby reducing unnecessary expense by both parties.
25. CAL. Evm. CODE §1157. By protecting such records against court subpoena,
physicians are likely to be more candid in their testimony concerning mistakes of their
own or of colleagues. This often results in a settlement rather than a lengthy suit.

1973 / Medical Malpractice Actions
an admission of liability;2 6 a law minimizing frivolous malpractice suits

by requiring plaintiff to post a $500 bond if the defendant can show
to the satisfaction of the court that the plaintiff has no reasonable cause

of action; 27 a law preventing civil liability on the part of a doctor rendering emergency care necessitated by the prior medical care of another
physician;28 a law providing that rescue teams, hospitals, and specified

others are immune from liability for an act or omission while attempting to resuscitate a person who is in immediate threat of death, provided

they are properly trained and equipped; 29 a law providing that no act
or omission of any rescue team in an authorized emergency vehicle,

while attempting to resuscitate any person in immediate danger of loss
of life, shall result in liability to the rescue team, or owners or operators, if good faith is exercised; 0 a law allowing for discovery in arbitration cases involving personal injury; 31 a law establishing a statute
of limitations of one year from time of discovery or four years from

date of injury, whichever occurs first; 32 a law freezing the complicated
res ipsa loquitur doctrine into law; 33 and a law extending the "good

Samaritan" concept into the emergency room setting. 34

PROBLEM OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

Since 1969 California law has attempted to discourage frivolous malpractice suits by requiring the plaintiff to post a bond as security for

the costs of defending against the action. Under Section 1029.6 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff may be required to post such

security if it is shown at a hearing that the plaintiff will not suffer
any undue economic hardship in making such a deposit and that there

is no reasonable possibility that the plaintiff has a cause of action.35
The security cannot exceed $500 unless there are multiple defendants,

each filing a motion, in which case a maximum of $1,000 may be
26. CAL. INS. CODE §11583. By allowing the plaintiff to receive early financial
assistance, particularly a plaintiff with limited means, it is conceivable that the suit
will be withdrawn and the need for a trial eliminated.
27. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.6.
28. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §2144.5.
29. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §1426.
30.

CAL. VEHICLE CODE

§165.5.

31. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §1283. The availability of all pertinent information
to an arbitration panel substantially increases the chance that the professional liability
case will be settled short of litigation.
32. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §340.5. This effectively establishes an absolute fouryear statute of limitations in malpractice cases. An additional benefit will be the elimination of the need for insurance carriers to carry huge reserves required by the previous
absence of an effective statute of limitations.
33. CAL. EvID. CODE §646. Codification of this doctrine will assist the preparation of defense by eliminating the previously unknown element of meaning and interpretation which a particular court might apply.
34. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §1407.5.
35. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.6(a).
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demanded by the court.3 6 These provisions apply to both compensatory and exemplary damages. If the plaintiff is successful in any portion of his action, the defendant is then37required to make reimbursement for the cost of obtaining the security.
It was alleged, however, that despite this security requirement, the
plaintiff who did file a medical malpractice action prayed for exemplary
damages routinely when there was no real basis for recovery. 8 The
purpose of such a prayer was to give plaintiff's attorney a "wedge" to
use for settlement.3 9 This wedge came about as a result of public
policy in California that prohibited a person from insuring himself
against intentional wrongdoing. 40 Based on this public policy, California statutes governing carriers which provide professional malpractice insurance prohibit coverage for any amount awarded as exemplary
41
damages.
To give rise to exemplary damages, a doctor's behavior must be very
extreme, i.e., willful conduct accompanied by aggravating circumstances amounting to malice.4 2 Such accusations made against a professional of the healing arts are likely to result in a well publicized trial.
Such a trial may result in the potential destruction of the doctor's professional career. 43 Therefore, when a doctor is named as a defendant
and exemplary damages are sought, he will be faced with potential
personal liability and threatened in his career. Fearing this, doctors
pressure their insurance carriers to make prompt out-of-court settlements on the compensatory damages.44
With these factors in mind, it is alleged that a plaintiff's attorney
commonly seeks exemplary damages primarily to "blackjack" the defendant into settlement. 45 It is this blackjacking that led to the further restriction involved in the 1972 malpractice legislation.
THE NEw LAW-ANALYSIS AND EFFECT
Aimed at reducing the blackjack effect described above, the new
36. CA. CODE CIV. PRoc. §1029.6(c).

37. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.6(d).
38. Los Angeles Daily Journal, May 18, 1972, at 20, col. 4.
39. AMERICAN TRL LAwYERs AssociATioN, supra note 7, at 61.
40. Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional Torts, 20
HAST. LJ. 1219, 1245 (1969).
41.

CAL. CIV. CODE §§1668, 3294; CAL. INs. CODE §533.

42. [Irn order to warrant the allowance of punitive damages the act complained of must not only be willful in the sense of intentional, but it must also
be accompanied by aggravating circumstances, amounting to malice ....
There must be an intent to vex, annoy or injure. Mere spite or ill will is not
sufficient; and mere negligence, even gross negligence is not sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages.
Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 894, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 708 (1972).
43. Hanson & Stromberg, Hospital Liability for Negligence, 21 HAST. L.J. 1,
23 (1969).

44. Los Angeles Daily Journal, May 18, 1972, at 20, col. 4.
45. Los Angeles Daily Journal, July 6, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
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law, embodied in Section 1029.6(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
places an obstacle before the frivolous litigant through the imposition
of a $2,500 security requirement. This security requirement is conditioned upon the plaintiff's payment of all costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in defending against the request
for the award of exemplary damages. The security is imposed upon
the motion of any defendant. If the security is not filed within thirty
days after the order is served, the portion of the complaint requesting
exemplary damages will be stricken. While the frequency with which
exemplary damages are awarded in medical malpractice actions is extremely low,46 the purpose of this law is to reduce the number of
instances in which they are initially sought, thereby relieving doctors
of the pressure to make compensatory damage settlements larger than
they would otherwise.4T
This new statute is not the only California code section which requires a plaintiff to post a security bond to cover costs incurred by
the defendant in his defense of a civil action. Such security is also
required when the plaintiff is a non-resident, 8 a minority stockholder in a
derivative suit,49 a "vexatious" litigant,"0 when the defendant is a public entity,51 a public employee, 52 an engineer or an architect,53 or
where the cause of action is defamation. 54 Although the amount of
the deposit required in these instances varies, these security requirements have a number of similarities. The motion to require the bond
is made by the defendant prior to the trial, and an opportunity is given
the plaintiff to show why the bond should not be required (except
when the defendant is a public entity or a public employee, in which
case the plaintiff is given no such opportunity, the security being automatically required upon defendant's demand and service). In ruling
on the motion, the court has a degree of discretion to decide whether
to require the bond or not and, if so, in what amount.
As amended by Senate Bill 941, Section 1029.6(e) of the Code of
Civil Procedure is unique in several ways. In this portion of the statute, the defendant may move the court for an ex parte order.5 5 This
46. 2 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRAClICE 557 (1971).
J. WALTZ & F. INBAU, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 297 (1971).

See also,

47. Interview with J. Michael Allen, supra note 22.
48. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1030.
49. CAL. CORP. CODE §834(b).
50. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §391 et seq.
51. CAL. Gov'T CODE §947(a).
52. CAL. GOV'T CODE §951.
53. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.5.
54. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §830.
55. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.6(e):
Whenever a complaint described in subdivision (a) requests an award of
exemplary damages, any defendant against whom the damages are sought may
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seems to be inconsistent with the previous part of the statute: subsection (a) of Section 1029.6, designed to deter frivolous suits in their entirety, permits the plaintiff to attend a hearing and present his position
as to why the bond should not be required,o whereas subsection (e),
designed to deter frivolous prayers for exemplary damages, provides

for an ex parte order based entirely on the defendant's motion. The
new section has no requirement for notice to other affected parties,

no requirement for a hearing, and no requirement that the defendant
show a need or justification for the posting.

In addition, unlike other security requirements, subsection (e)requires that the court "shall" require the plaintiff to file the bond or
make the cash deposit upon the filing of the defendant's motion.

In

all of the above mentioned statutes requiring security cost bondsG7
and in subsection (a) of this very statute, the court is given a degree

of discretion.

In subsection (e), however, the requirement imposed

is a mechanical one. No provision is made for consideration of the
merits of the case, the financial status of the plaintiff, the burden which

might be imposed, or any other relevant circumstance. The inelastic
minimum of $2,500 is imposed automatically.
There are several additional aspects of this statute which are important to note. First, subsection (e) contains no provision for reimbursement to the plaintiff of the costs incurred in posting the surety bond

or cash deposit should the plaintiff prevail in his action for exemplary
damages. Subsection (d) does make such a provision for the $500
security required by subsection (a). Arguably, the reimbursement portion of subsection (d) is also applicable to the $2,500 security requirement of subsection (e). However, the strict wording of subsection (d), coupled with the fact that the legislature left the provision

physically preceding subsection (e) in the overall statutory framework
of the section and made no similar provision within or following submove the court for an ex parte order requiring the plaintiff to file a corporate
surety bond, approved by the court, or make a cash deposit in an amount
fixed by the court. Upon the filing of the motion, the court shall require the
plaintiff to file the bond or make the cash deposit. In no event shall the
bond or cash deposit be less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500).
The bond or cash deposit shall be conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of
all costs and reasonable attorney's fees ircurrred by the defendant in defending against the request for the award of exemplary damages, as determined by the court, if the plaintiff fails to recover any exemplary damages.
The order requiring the bond or cash deposit shall require the bond to be filed
or cash deposit to be made with the clerk of the court not later than 30 days
after the order is served. If the bond is not filed or cash deposit is not made
within such period, upon the motion of the defendant, the court shall strike the
portion of the complaint which requests the award of exemplary damages.
56. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.6(a): "[Alny ... defendant may . .. move the
court for an order, upon notice to plaintiff ... and hearing, requiring the plaintiff to
furnish ... security for costs of defense
57. See notes 48-54 supra.

910
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section (e), appears to mean that the plaintiff will bear the cost of the
security deposit even if he successfully recovers the exemplary damages.
Secondly, a plaintiff may be able to make a sufficient showing of
negligence to prevail in the malpractice action for compensatory damages, but be unable to show the "aggravating circumstances amounting
to malice ' 58 that is required for an award of exemplary damages. In
this situation, the portion of the complaint requesting exemplary damages will be denied, and the plaintiff will then have to pay the defendant's cost and reasonable attorney's fees for defending that portion of
the action or forfeit the security. 59
An additional problem for the plaintiff arises in that every defendant named in the complaint may move for the security requirement
against every plaintiff.6 ° Thus, if the good faith plaintiff seeks exemplary damages against a doctor, two registered nurses, and a hospital, he will have to post $10,000 just to be able to retain the
request for exemplary damages in the complaint. Furthermore, if two
plaintiffs should join together in the suit, each one will have to post
$10,000, a figure which would exclude all but the most flagrant practices from fair litigation.
The scope of potential defendants covered by the law is extensive.
All of the publicity surrounding the bill addressed itself to problems
encountered by doctors.61 As written, however, the section applies
to thirteen additional classes of defendants ranging from dispensing op-

ticians to veterinarians.62
Though all of the above mentioned characteristics may raise some
doubt about the overall wisdom of the new law, there is a more pervading question which must be answered, for even though the new code
section may seem unfair, it will remain as law unless it is also found
63
to be unconstitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
In committee hearings held prior to the enactment of Senate Bill
941, a witness for opponents of the bill told the Assembly Judiciary
Committee that the bill might violate the mandate of due process of
58.
59.
60.
61.
Pol. 4.
62.
63.

Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 894, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706, 708 (1972).
CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §1029.6(e).
Id.
Los Angeles Daily Journal, May 18, 1972, at 20, col. 4; July 6, 1972, at 1,
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.6(a).
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
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the United States Constitution. 64 If there is serious doubt as to the validity of the amended statute, litigation may be expected. What then are
the constitutional problems raised by Senate Bill 941? Does a law which
requires a plaintiff to post a $2,500 surety bond or cash deposit in order
to include within his complaint a prayer for exemplary damages meet
both the due process and equal protection mandates of the fourteenth
amendment?
The due process clause has been interpreted to mean that a state
may not adjudicate the rights and obligations of a defendant without
providing him reasonable notice and opportunity to appear for an appropriate hearing. 65 Absent this meaningful opportunity to be heard,
the promise of the due process clause goes unfulfilled.,6
Nor does a defendant receive equal protection if the opportunity to
obtain such a hearing depends on his financial status. This principle
was clarified in Griffin v. Illinois67 wherein the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a state law denying appellate review to persons convicted of a crime merely because they were unable to pay for a transcript of the trial. In the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Black stated,
"There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."6 8 From this line of thinking,
it followed naturally that the indigent appellant was entitled not only to
a record, but also to counsel since such assistance was available to the
affluent appellant.6 9 The growth of Griffin has been steady and has
been extended to invalidate, inter alia, procedures whereby a state
supreme court would not consider cases within its jurisdiction if the
person could not pay the filing fee 0 and whereby state courts would
not consider habeas corpus writs without payment of a filing fee. 71
The early case law development regarding protection of indigents
in general involved litigation of rights of defendants and dealt only
with criminal matters. It was not long, however, until there emerged
a recognition of a right of access to the courts for defendants in civil
actions as well. A civil defendant's right to due process was held to
have been violated under a Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnishment
64. Los Angeles Daily Journal, July 6, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
65. "Inhere can be no doubt that at a minimum [due process] requires that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
66. Id. at 318.
67. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
68. Id. at 19.
69. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) ("In either case the evil is
the same: discrimination against the indigent").
70. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
71. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).

912
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statute which sanctioned the "taking" of his property without affording

him prior notice and a hearing. 72 Similarly, a state statute imposing
a poll tax of $1.50 was struck as violating the equal protection clause

because of its resulting deterrent effect upon the exercise of voting
rights by indigents. 73 Mr. Justice Douglas spoke directly to the point
the next year when he said,
[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
is not limited to criminal prosecutions. Its protections extend
as well to civil matters. I can see no more justification for denying an indigent a hearing in an eviction proceeding solely because
of his poverty than for denying an indigent the right to appeal
the right to file a habeas corpus petition or the right to obtain a
74
transcript necessary for appeal.

Following this thinking, a United States circuit court announced in

1970,
The Equal Protection Clause applies to both civil and criminal
cases; the Constitution protects life, liberty and property. It is the
importance of the right to the individual, not the technical distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance to a
court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in
75
each case.

Having reached this point in the development of the law, the next
question posed was the extent to which fourteenth amendment
protections are available to litigants seeking access to the court for the

first time to settle private disputes. In March 1971, the United States
Supreme Court decided Boddie v. Connecticut76 and in the opinion pro-

vided an indication of the direction the law will take in this area.
In Boddie, the Supreme Court found that two Connecticut statutes
were unconstitutional as applied to the appellants. Gladys Boddie and

seven other plaintiffs, all welfare recipients, attempted to commence
divorce actions in the Connecticut courts, but could not afford to pay
72. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See also Randone
v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), wherein the
appellant's right to due process was violated by CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §537(1) which
authorized attachment of a bank account by a collection agency without any prior
notice or hearing.
73. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
74. Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, 1039-40 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from a denial of writ of certiorari; citations omitted). The case involved a Georgia
summary eviction statute which provided the landlord a means to oust a tenant very
quickly merely by filing an affidavit that the tenant has held over and failed to pay
rent. The tenant could stop the eviction and obtain a jury trial by filing a counter affidavit denying the landlord's allegations, but in order to do so he had to tender a security
bond payable to the landlord for the amount of rent and any other costs which might be
recovered against him.
75. Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
76. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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the $45 filing fees and the $15 service-of-process fees imposed on persons commencing civil lawsuits. After failing in their attempts to have
the requirements waived, they challenged the constitutionality of the
fees as applied to indigents. A federal district court dismissed the complaint,77 and it was subsequently appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. In reversing the previous decision, the opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice Harlan stated,
Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage
relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving
this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying,
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals

78
who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.
The question of how far Boddie will be extended and whether it is
applicable to a state security requirement statute is yet to be determined. There is language in the opinion which appears to curb any
implications of a blanket extension making Boddie applicable to plaintiffs in all civil actions.7 9 Mr. Justice Harlan emphasized that the decision was heavily influenced by the facts that the state had exclusive
control of the method of dissolving the marriage and that marriage is
a "fundamental human relationship."80 On the other hand, the opinion
contains many indications that the Supreme Court may be progressing
slowly toward a constitutional guarantee of free access to the courts for
the poor.81

A.

Due Process

In discussing the first important element of the Boddie decision,
i.e., the state having exclusive control of the method of dissolving a
marriage, the Court acknowledged that a state could deny access to its
techniques of final dispute settlement under certain circumstances.8 2
Where there are still effective alternatives for the adjustment of differ77. 286 F. Supp. 968 (D.Conn. 1968).
78.
79.
tlement,
ognized,

76.

401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
"The legitimacy of the State's monopoly over techniques of final dispute seteven where some are denied access to its use, stands unimpaired where receffective alternatives for the adjustment of differences remain." Id. at 375-

80. We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right
that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of
any individual, for, as we have already noted, in the case before us this
right is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human

relationship. The requirement that these appellants resort to the judicial process is entirely a state-created matter.
Id. at 382-83.

81. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 40, 104 (1971).
82. 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971).
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ences, the state may monopolize its settlement techniques even though
some citizens will be denied access.8 3 Thus the access to court is limited to those plaintiffs who have been unable to obtain by private arrangement the relief which they now seek in court.
Discussing the Boddie plaintiffs, the Court indicated an absence of
knowledge of any jurisdiction in which husband and wife could free
themselves from the legal obligations of marriage or prohibitions
against remarriage without the use of the state's judicial machinery. 4
Resort to the court was thus not voluntary in the sense that it was not
only the "paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, the only
available one."' 5 There were no effective alternatives for the adjustment of the differences between the parties, and access to the courts
was required to fulfill the due process requirement.8 6
Upon first consideration, it may seem that a plaintiff seeking exemplary damages for medical malpractice may have sufficient alternative methods for settling the dispute and thus be exluded from the
courts. This conclusion, however, is subject to serious doubt. Though
the tort claimant has a power to settle his dispute with the tortfeasor,
a power the divorce plaintiff does not have, the alternatives for settlement may be illusory. There is no alternative for exemplary damages
from the malpractice insurance carrier;8" nor is it likely that the physician will admit liability and pay these damages voluntarily. Thus the
ultimate remedy for the tort plaintiff may be held by the state."" The
courts constitute "the exclusive means through which almost any dispute can ultimately be resolved short of brute force. 89 The first distinction set out in Boddie may thus be subject to erosion, allowing other
plaintiffs access to court even though some available alternatives do
exist. 90
The second important element recognized in granting the Boddie
plaintiffs access to court was the "basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values." 91 This aspect of the case
83. Id. at 375.
84. Id. at 376.
85. Id. at 377.
86. Id. at 376.
87. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
88. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 956 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting from a denial of a writ of certiorari).
89. Id. at 957.
90. A State has an ultimate monopoly of all judicial process and attendant
enforcement machinery. As a practical matter, if disputes cannot be successfully settled between the parties, the court system is usually the only
forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort to the judicial
process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that
of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in court.
concurring).
401 U.S. 371, 387 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
91. Id. at 374.
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has also been viewed as too limiting. It has been suggested that divorce
is just not very fundamental in our hierarchy of values and that a
court which believes that it is would necessarily view many other rights
as fundamental. 2 Posing an example which may be easily applied
to a malpractice plaintiff, Mr. Justice Black said,
Society generally encourages people to seek recompense when they
suffer damages through the fault of others. And I cannot believe that my Brethren would find the rights of a man with
both legs cut off by a negligent rairoad less "fundamental" than
a person's right to seek a divorce. . . . For this Court to have first
provided for governmental assumption of civil court costs in a divorce case seems to me a most unfortunate point of departure.03
It may well be that exemplary damages arising out of a medical malpractice claim may constitute a fundamental position in society's hierarchy of values. 94 With this and other important public policies in
mind, the fundamental quality sought to be attributed to divorce
could easily be extended to many other causes of action."
Once the Court found that the Boddie plaintiffs had a fundamental
cause of action, the settlement of which required state monopolized
techniques, they announced that due process demanded that plaintiffs
be given access to the courts to solve their problems. In so doing,
they may have added "access to court" to the class of fundamental
interests which had previously included such rights as voting and
criminal appellate defense. 96 This would mean that, absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, due process would
require that, at a minimum, a person forced to settle his claims of
right and duty through the judicial process be granted an opportunity
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner appropriate
97

to the case.

It would be well to distinguish at this point the relief sought by the
Boddie plaintiffs and the relief sought by the medical malpractice
plaintiff seeking exemplary damages. The former seek to dissolve a
legal relationship while the latter seeks to recover dollar damages as a
punishment for tortious behavior. 98 It is agreed that exemplary dam92. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 957-58 (1971).
93. Id. at 958.
94. "Adequate shelter, compensation for serious personal injury, or relief from
unbearable debt-all of which may become the subject of litigation-also seem no less
important as prerequisites to personal happiness than the ability to dissolve an unwanted
marriage." The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 81, at 107 n.17 (1971).
95. "I see no constitutional distinction between appellants' attempt to enforce this
state statutory right and an attempt to vindicate any other right arising under federal
or state law." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 387 (1971).
96. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 81, at 109.
97. 401 U.S. at 377-78.
98. CAL. Civ. CODE §3294.
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ages are not a matter of right for they may be withheld by the jury
and when awarded they are a windfall to the plaintiff.9 9 Neverthe-

less, the statute creates a potential right to recovery 00 which should
be protected against unconstitutional violations.10 1
Recalling the characteristics of the California Legislature's 1972
amendment to Section 1029.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 0 2 and

applying the Boddie logic to it, will it satisfy the due process requirements? Does the State have a monopoly on the ultimate machinery
for settling disputes about exemplary damages?

Is the plaintiff's right

to seek exemplary damages for the doctor's action a "fundamental"
right deserving protection? Does the plaintiff have an opportunity to
be heard (the order is ex parte) at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner? Will his inability to post a $2,500 surety bond or cash deposit foreclose his access to a court which can settle the dispute?
B.

Equal Protection

It should be noted that the majority opinion in Boddie made no suggestion of an equal protection issue. 03

There were, however, two

concurring opinions, one by Mr. Justice Douglas' 04 and one by Mr.
Justice Brennan, 0 which discussed the application of the fee requirement to indigents as a denial of equal protection. There was also a
dissent by Mr. Justice Black based on his belief that civil trials should

not be hampered by the same strict and rigid fourteenth amendment
rules applicable to criminal trials,' 1° but he subsequently acknowledged
that fees which bar plaintiffs access to court are not consistent with the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.0 7 The language of these
opinions denounces any and all fee requirements which would deny a
person any right to which he is otherwise entitled. Mr. Justice Bren-

nan succinctly stated,
99. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToaTS 13 (4th ed. 1971).
100. CAL. Clv. CODE §3294.
101. "Even where the only rights to be adjudicated are those created and protected
by state law, due process requires that state procedures be adequate to allow all those
concerned a fair hearing of their state law claims." McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183, 256 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
102. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
103. "Indeed, Justice Harlan completely ignored the rapid expansion of the equal
protection doctrine over the past fifteen years by failing to cite any equal protection decision since Griffin v. Illinois." The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 81, at 108
n.22.
104. 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971).
105. Id. at 386.
106. Id. at 389.
107. In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest on only
one crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States and each of
the States belong to the people of this country and that no person can be denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot
pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney.
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955-56 (1971).
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The rationale of Griffin covers the present case. Courts are the
central dispute-settling institutions in our society. They are bound
to do equal justice under law, to rich and poor alike. They fail to
perform their function in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause if they shut their doors to indigent plaintiffs altogether.
Where money determines not merely "the kind of trial a man
gets," Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1965), but whether
he gets into court at all, the great principle of equal protection becomes a mockery. A State may not make its judicial processes
available to some but deny them to others simply because they
cannot pay a fee.' 0 8
I-ow will the equal protection clause apply to the security deposit
requirement of Section 1029.6(e) of the California Code of Civil Procedure? 10 9 Will a plaintiff who can meet every requirement of California Civil Code Section 3294, concerning the elements required for
an award of exemplary damages,"10 be denied the right of recovery because he cannot afford the cost of the bond? Will the right to seek
exemplary damages be open to the affluent but foreclosed to the poor?
As to this right, will the courts be a private preserve for the affluent?
Here again it is helpful to distinguish the fee required by the Boddie
plaintiffs from the deposit of the malpractice plaintiff seeking exemplary damages. The former were required to pay $60 before they
could even gain access to court. The latter is not denied access1 ' if
the $2,500 is not posted, but is barred from including within his complaint a prayer for exemplary damages. 1 2 Nevertheless, the requirement that a poor plaintiff post a security bond before his claim for exemplary damages is heard may bar his access to the court to determine
his rights on that issue as did the fee requirements in Boddie."'
A security deposit requirement may raise a somewhat more difficult
constitutional question than a filing fee due to its different purpose.
A security deposit protects one party from expenses incurred by litigation. A mandatory waiver of the security deposit causes the state to
108. 401 U.S. at 388-89.
109. Recall that the judge has no discretion in the matter but must, upon defendant's motion, issue an ex parte order for a minimum of $2,500. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
110. CAL. CrV. CODE §3294: "In an action for the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover
damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
111. Further, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.6(a) requires a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages to post $500 security only if the defendant shows to the court's satisfaction that plaintiff would not suffer undue economic hardship in making such a
filing.
112. CAL. CODE CMy. PROC. §1029.6(e).
113. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 81, at 112.
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abandon its policy of protecting that party.1 14 Still, such a deposit may
be a greater obstacle than is needed to provide the protection.'1 5 The
Court recognized this problem in the Boddie decision and discussed
fees designed to deter frivolous litigation. They viewed this justification
very skeptically, however, and pointed out alternatives by which the
state might achieve the same purpose without barring a poor man from
presenting a meritorious suit: e.g., penalties for false pleadings or affidavits and actions for malicious prosecution or abuse of process." 6
The Court also took the opportunity to distinguish a previous case" 7
in which it upheld a security deposit requirement for a stockholder's
derivative suit by indicating the differences between derivative actions
of shareholders and divorce actions of individuals.""
EXTENSION OF BODDIE V. CONNECTICUT

In light of the severely limiting statement made by Mr. Justice Harlan
in the Boddie opinion, 119 there is doubt as to possible extension of the
rule. On the other hand, there are indications that the rule and logic
of Boddie may not be restricted to its facts. In his concurring opinion, 120 Mr. Justice Brennan differed with the majority on two points.
One, as discussed above,' 2 ' was the equal protection issue. The other
was the narrow application. He took the position that the state had a
monopoly on all judicial machinery and that there was no constitutional distinction between the rights sought to be enforced by the Bod22
die plaintiffs and any other rights arising under federal or state law.'
He indicated that the two distinctions made by the majority12 would
not withstand analysis and that "the right to be heard in some way at
some time extends to all proceedings entertained by courts.' 2 4
Mr. Justice Black dissented in Boddie, indicating that the strict due
process rules applicable in criminal cases should not hamper the government in the conduct of civil trials. 2 5 Two months later, however,
he indicated that if the decision were to stand the restrictions announced
by the majority should not apply. 12 In this later opinion, he indi114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 401 U.S. at 381-82.
117. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
118. 401 U.S. at 381 n.9.
119. See note 80 supra.
120. 401 U.S. at 386.
121. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
122. 401 U.S. at 387.
123. The state monopolization of methods for settling divorce disputes and the
fundamental position of marriage in society. Id. at 374.
124. Id. at 387-88.
125. Id. at 391.
126. I dissented in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971), but now
believe that if the decision in that case is to continue to be the law, it cannot
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cated the course which the Court might be taking and stressed his belief that the rule of Boddie should not be limited.1 27 Furthermore,
since the Boddie opinion was delivered, there has been conjecture that
the majority opinion itself left room for a liberalization of the rule.1 28
It may be theorized that the security deposit requirement will not
deny access to anyone with a meritorious claim for exemplary damages
because as a matter of practicality his attorney will post the deposit
for him. This line of reasoning, however, is subject to question. Suppose that the financial ability of the lawyer is such that he cannot afford to make the deposit either. Are we not then confronted with fourteenth amendment issues all over again?
The question which California courts will have to answer is whether
or not the Boddie rule will be extended to find that a plaintiff seeking exemplary damages for medical malpractice is denied his fourteenth
amendment rights by a statute which requires him to post a bond of
no less than $2,500 in order to present his claim for exemplary damages
to a jury.
ALTERNATIVES

Conceding for the purpose of discussion that attorneys have used
prayers for exemplary damages to "blackjack" physicians into settlements, might not the evil have been remedied by an amendment less
likely to deprive a good faith plaintiff of his fourteenth amendment
rights?
While under consideration, the bill was criticized on several counts
and amendments were offered. The criticisms and amendments were
aimed at the elimination of the portion of the bill requiring an ex parte
order and at the automatic minimum figure of $2,500.19 The amendments, however, were rejected by the author of the bill.3 0
and should not be restricted to persons seeking a divorce. It is bound to be
expanded to all civil cases. Persons seeking a divorce are no different from
other members of society who must resort to the judicial process for resolution
of their disputes. Consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, special favors cannot and should not be accorded to divorce litigants.
Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 n.1 (1971).
127. Some may sincerely believe that the decision in Boddie was far more
limited in scope-that is, applies only to divorce eases. Other people might
recognize that this constitutional decision will eventually extend to all civil
cases but believe that it can only be enforced slowly step by step, so that the
country will have time to absorb its full import. But in my judgment, Beddie cannot and should not be limited to either its facts or its language, and I
believe there can be no doubt that this country can afford to provide court
costs and lawyers to Americans who are now barred by their poverty from
resort to the law for resolution of their disputes.
Id. at 956.
128. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 81, at 106.
129. Los Angeles Daily Journal, May 18, 1972, at 20, coL 2.
130. Id.

920
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Perhaps an amendment of this nature would have eliminated doubt
as to the constitutionality of the statute. By permitting the plaintiff
to be present at the hearing and to speak on his own behalf, the law would
go much further in fulfilling the mandate of a reasonable hearing at
a reasonable time required by the due process clause. By allowing the
judge a degree of discretion to ascertain the plaintiff's financial ability
before setting the minimum amount of the security, the assurance of
equal protection would be more certain.
CONCLUSION

If it is true that plaintiff's attorneys have used frivolous prayers for
exemplary damages to "blackjack" doctors into settlements in medical
malpractice actions, then it is commendable that the California Legislature has taken action to remedy this practice. But if in so doing, the
legislature has enacted a law that will impose an unreasonable barrier
on the good faith plaintiff with a valid case for exemplary damages, the
whole purpose will be defeated, for unless this law can withstand constitutional attack, it will benefit no one.
Notwithstanding the constitutional questions, in a period when the
courts and the legislature are demonstrating an increasing concern for
the plight of the poorer members of society and for assuring that they
have access to legal machinery for the settlement of disputes, the provisions of Senate Bill 941, now embodied in Section 1029.6 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, raise serious questions of its viability as a
public policy.
Gary L. Vinson

